Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4724649cea34cb52…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.8 KB
MD5: 4680778dfeb948003b7c76bb5cebb6ea SHA-1: 1848ce0cfcce24843588adfb74cc7e84c1feb68d SHA-256: 4724649cea34cb5278514675fbd384ab64412352047802cc6adbda61832b45d9
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including embedded JavaScript, a RichMedia (Flash) object, and the use of ASCIIHexDecode filters, which are often employed to obfuscate malicious code. The presence of embedded JavaScript suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code or exploit vulnerabilities within the PDF reader. The embedded Flash content further increases the likelihood of exploit delivery. The extracted JavaScript stream, although obfuscated, likely contributes to the overall malicious functionality, potentially by downloading and executing additional payloads.

Heuristics 9

  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE
    String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0016.bin
8f9c84c8c00bc62ae296a81fac6640aa852ea67548abc1bd639aa0da1a1696c4
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x10B1 27347 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
javascript_obj0006_000.js
27737377f1c50f413756f63c522fe8940e1093fabe68edb1ec3d11190e3b4042
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x105 11544 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).