Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4706d15e599d66d5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

125.3 KB Created: 2021-07-25 13:27:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 289735acb711e546d9f19dfd077edacc SHA-1: 0f6f326dc114a23379df84f5e78d8bc10fe0b3f7 SHA-256: 4706d15e599d66d52b75f677d68709b34c460cf2f08bd564ee3431e21bd71eea
276 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded script and multiple links to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting it is designed to deliver a second-stage payload. The 'Clipboard command execution lure' heuristic indicates the document instructs users to copy and paste commands, a common tactic for executing downloaded malware. The embedded script itself is XMP metadata and does not contain executable code, but the overall structure and heuristics point to a malicious downloader.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9987

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://delawaretravelmedicine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089521ce13a6---zufogido.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://hellnocancershow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a403518770e---duninojenudekalow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.techsrollout.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bed1a378ce---89203157510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://restravel.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/neguzepapakijogikodimuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webornate.com/viking1/uploads/files/bugorujijelux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://driver-jazda.pl/upload/file/76790145648.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://edusfera.pl/upload/file/14648653974.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jpjplumbingandheating.com/FCKeditor/file/tekokemoxonowopesajeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sushinamu.com/uploads/files/36348657015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doellefjelde-mussemarked.dk/images/newsmail/file/xazoropudenax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://adbetelparaguay.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e53769c4ba260cadb23182bb334a0685/davapuwativewibalunoweg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baloneacessorios.com/_upload/file///kutisijejeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sewakendragroup.com/userfiles/file/55280533667.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://menafundinfo.com/userfiles/file/xoloxegelutevoxobavix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nacyc.jp/Upload/file/74806288873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://glass-haus.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8a2346e51dd2ec1d27b5a049fd340fd0/zozinegogaxukexememunuka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://advicezone.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ek1h0kr73ioak3mo1dcabel50c/jugetejagewi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zulfugar.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085a5aa54778---52871911803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://loskutova.site/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f8b3029abb3883be41f94935f9633c23/90585013572.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.numberoneporthill.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f69bec0be93---69370008792.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gmonlinestore.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607e7a02e7e31---manalepatoje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://caacoding.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac7de1c328b---23819021288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://steclotildehorton.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b5581c35758---sobikujatomisizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.majorisinvestimentos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070723b687fd---fonababedufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=windows+10+command+prompt+cheat+sheet+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001efde.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1EFDE 1638 bytes
SHA-256: ce941c5574b5e8b541b7e3f235d8f09d7789b4bf3de4153f98ff86494ee081b0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Karbon'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Sasofifixo Vidige</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows 10 command prompt cheat sheet pdf.  Related tags:      Windows      Linux      Powershell      Bash      Wsl     DRAFT: Command Line Ut</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Windows 10 command prompt cheat sheet pdf.  Related tags:      Windows      Linux      Powershell      Bash      Wsl     DRAFT: Command Line Ut</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Windows 10 command prompt cheat sheet pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Karbon'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-12T19:38:18'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Karbon'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='310648f6-72ee-48bd-ae86-4618396d20f5'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='aa814627-4edf-4535-ad33-0dfce151ba2d'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0001828e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1828E 18268 bytes
SHA-256: 7b853f384218241ca4066c9d42d09e7bf40e164619039d32d68632431c645128
font_01_sfnt_off0001b328.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B328 11092 bytes
SHA-256: 5c2dc2d64ce67e02ebf7cb8536ecd448ddeb94706a8cec90d74e88a5a4d5abd6
font_02_sfnt_off0001cce9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1CCE9 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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