Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46d62441a49ef9ca…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 369eb82f2b32981b93aa9df9bf5cc01b SHA-1: 9e73546f6555b72657b00b7361f9cc8dcf8c095a SHA-256: 46d62441a49ef9ca19a4d5422eb08bfa091c80893a6ef1d8f1c48b94db0d06b5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting client-side vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007f.bin
ff4ca72ea534230a4edcfbe513877cca6a1b6ac954e412ce8e7b68a01a7b9ab9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7F 1766 bytes