Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46d503e59644a8ed…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.9 KB First seen: 2019-09-30
MD5: 5490c1e4d74fa744d5a008033b5e5dbd SHA-1: 8dcc587e5ab3516d80066be2b0c2f383b9049d74 SHA-256: 46d503e59644a8ed50bb9897bd1fea2c036a9bc0b45b15260f8346521c12b226
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of the Equation Editor CLSID and the specific CVE firing strongly indicate this exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 4469 bytes
SHA-256: 151d234ab889ed7cf995c08a6a61962d0aa54db2aaf6dd94765b68d6de629086