Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46ace31c8214ec89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.7 KB Created: 2020-09-06 17:11:43 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 8dc054b4720fb502acf71239e796d8fd SHA-1: 9bfb3242c890b1e95af438391caa9f0eff88ba8f SHA-256: 46ace31c8214ec89637c913d9aef6ed2b169166bde2a4743c32b2782631fda02
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.link/pify?keyword=forticlient+6.+2+datasheet In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/22739b_b32fd64fd42a4eafa8707990fda65179.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a1c7bc2589ff442eaeb0f013c4b53601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/5e8de6_db7e778a966e4389926dcfa1ec743d9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0107/7142/files/43514333035.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0721/2694/files/25592923917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7665/7051/files/64705103124.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8441/5143/files/togerofunogelut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8860/8418/files/describing_weather_worksheet_ks3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7817/3343/files/nelixotuparerulexana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/9775/8622/files/tezugupuxamupuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4932/0610/files/99208479721.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/60e703_2a3d8d84b0cc46c2845167627039fd01.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/374ce0_8154e0c9e8f94e949c3f9b7fc0f95eed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/d61b30_4410508e5d634a20b3b6a23806edb5df.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/c33f71_891843622bc0416aa5aafc49ec312af5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/625844_9cc0ef4425e34623ab7666cbd7520acf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000062fa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62FA 5300 bytes
SHA-256: b1c7bc231ee1f46094c618bc393ad905924d9a2e9735a82677b9e84a6bc321e7
font_01_sfnt_off000074fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x74FD 9608 bytes
SHA-256: 91e2ed73d32e4369de345449423bf60386f7f9dbcaaf4416654911c7a746d045

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.