Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 469c9a5e2d3688f8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.54 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 54e50584ccaa05afaf20d1a5b20539a4 SHA-1: dc6eb04059912b3fe984a78bafa9059e0d50642e SHA-256: 469c9a5e2d3688f82ac2ba45589b37e34a6f75464e8292c2898a6f47b9fdf7fd
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit a known Microsoft Office vulnerability to gain initial access. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of OLE object activation for code execution. The primary goal is likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00182577.bin
63f000ac2c5c28ebbbabb3cf8da9aae29bbb79ddd90d05cbce166be48b563009		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x182577 3739 bytes

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