Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4699d83e3d4e1c7f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.1 KB Created: 2021-07-19 02:05:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 12888fb6b42174da70811dd2247a0f35 SHA-1: f037576261fe489f34b3414f759ae8949fb6af2b SHA-256: 4699d83e3d4e1c7fad4f55d819671b8d8c0e04f7815bc63b5177eb4cf59df2ac
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that employs a remote-support tool lure, instructing the user to install or connect with such a tool. This is a high-risk tactic in unsolicited documents, suggesting a phishing or social engineering attack. The document also contains numerous links to potentially compromised or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or redirect users to phishing sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and heuristic firings suggest it may exploit vulnerabilities or deliver a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kondicionery-ivanteevka.ru/upload_picture/file/95382514130.pdf
    • http://uyaviation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b98208c14a5---49323625322.pdf
    • http://usdcp.jp/user_data/userfiles/files/buvowetidaxos.pdf
    • http://mirutte.com/newsfiles/files/relufuvu.pdf
    • http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160718ce4bf26c---vimoseduduvubojisemufoba.pdf
    • http://bebsulmare.com/userfiles/files/16292657165.pdf
    • http://msslink.ru/userfiles/files/biretarudolomutemimuxo.pdf
    • https://salvatoredivilio.it/userfiles/file/5721331395.pdf
    • https://ildiko-szepsegszalon.hu/userfiles/file/21200769237.pdf
    • https://roweryelectra.pl/app/webroot/uploads/file/16251364651915.pdf
    • http://www.miamiairportlimo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16097122f1582a---15301679885.pdf
    • http://lucchetta.net/userfiles/files/lamowudiwepewaxanu.pdf
    • http://gennarimaq.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b6c3a3e9b6---87260570262.pdf
    • http://foto-klub.dk/userfiles/file/2471745538.pdf
    • http://oguzlarotomatiksanziman.com/depo/sayfaresim/file/45906827477.pdf
    • http://jtour.vn/userfiles/file/puxomifofopukimad.pdf
    • http://zentrumok.com/userfile/files/wixadafegan.pdf
    • http://trhs64.com/clients/c/cf/cfad56e582d93fa9eda51f2516e23bdb/File/vosobilesisiduresitis.pdf
    • https://spazmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606dc89771280---xobubowovowu.pdf
    • http://slp72.com/clients/7/7b/7b902bee17765b19ebdde6030f24742d/File/ditarazuxu.pdf
    • https://newoptic.mn/uploads/files/bipifudelivukelu.pdf
    • https://siphouse96.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/158a7b5c04cab1804158d2e929beaa9e/19656345110.pdf
    • http://smith-williamssisters.com/clients/d/dd/dd6cbc7353a6ef31c13ccaa63ab862ac/File/88625893649.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/fzgW7-mxBc0/uplcv?utm_term=car+logo+quiz+with+answers
    • http://lovewhereyoulv.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/11c7b6b9aeb113da7b7c3de4a1885551/gotafumagokidoburased.pdf
    • http://e1pl2.nazwa.pl/busy/fotki/file/49217265933.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e16f.bin
5a2ef051186eb67f1134650ba818aefa43f9c481d4327526792d3fbb624c10ba		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE16F 17672 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010e51.bin
e7d929a0eecf6da464b5d560b2df39ab5d1cbb5a6378b6bc6d9ad7053295cdb3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10E51 10812 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012707.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12707 16792 bytes

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