Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 467f622d2e2580c1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

537.6 KB Created: 2026-01-10 16:31:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-03-07
MD5: 845e577500714e436ed1eb89b70218c2 SHA-1: 3f2713b21cdae9b041df71eb487c7b8252f26aa0 SHA-256: 467f622d2e2580c17858cfe70064e5377346b477ee94faa68edfd8a2f1188e6e
542 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204 User Execution

The document leverages multiple critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation), via an embedded RTF object. The altChunk mechanism imports a large RTF file containing an OLE object that is automatically updated, triggering the exploitation. This process likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload, as indicated by the presence of a PE header within the RTF data and the CVE-2026-21514 bypass. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing, with the embedded exploits facilitating initial execution.

Heuristics 13

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
  • altChunk RTF auto-updates embedded executable object critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF_AUTOUPDATE_PE
    OOXML document imports an embedded RTF through altChunk; the RTF contains OLE object data, forces object update, and carries a hex-encoded PE payload. This is a stronger compound exploit-loader shape than a generic altChunk RTF wrapper, but it is not tied to a single CVE unless the nested RTF object primitive also matches one.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains ~1692KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/itic.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://csc3-2010-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://csc3-2010-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2010.cer0
    • https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
    • http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif04
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3-g5.crl04
    • https://www.globalsign.com/repository/0
    • http://ocsp.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g40C
    • http://secure.globalsign.com/cacert/gstsacasha384g4.crt0
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/ca/gstsacasha384g4.crl0
    • http://ocsp2.globalsign.com/rootr606
    • http://crl.globalsign.com/root-r6.crl0G
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControls
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/cus�

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af79f.bin
c553fa99f83718cb0ad6468c89afee9a775ea8a6462b5a4599637709276075c7		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF79F 742378 bytes
objdata_01_off002256cf.bin
da8cb70cfd8a429b702a62e2fdaacf621665f3e786e20e63a2796a2f2e40550b		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2256CF 610306 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799		 rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes

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