Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 466f477d82ecea8e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

153.6 KB Created: 2021-07-26 02:51:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: ab2f3a67c1ea90f425f9834aa7c42b36 SHA-1: 786a76ba47d9433e222d6092f7a8a95e600daa8e SHA-256: 466f477d82ecea8e62df06c8c34a3483206eaa8f5d0d1c10e3e0d03cad8df2fa
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a link farm pointing to numerous compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting an attempt to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the structure aligns with known techniques for hosting and distributing malware or phishing lures. No scripts were extracted, but the embedded URLs are the primary indicators of compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9821

Heuristics 5

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.eziblank.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5d34ac0978999f8498104d7d7bb54173/99326812665.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://epoxidice.ro/mm/file/65326234735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tele-fonika.pl/upload/file/45202232021.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kystop.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ucsgudp6elrpfojeqe3d3ailc3/juwurenojezadotadetani.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kingspec.su/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/37976drrj52ombsp1pu66k2v75/16263856371.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.revistadefiesta.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082ddb5b9da5---33540566327.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://teenvolunteer.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8b3c980d1c3c0f0f9a84a3094e94d587/81289229261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accesoriosalmayor.com/images/userfiles/file/xojilaxavatufekezam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://modelkyujin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090c7d20290e---vaxopusakadozofanaxiri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bright-inter.com/file_media/file_image/file/weroxewonokivedekoniw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kachhiproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8iruf9lj2ka64mvkjehfrl3462/19739206185.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.leesii.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160870d9bb691d---89829338366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carlojans.com/cms/file/fakezum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webtraffic.ch/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mitt9cspointtbn3mdla7gbam3/75044105898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bridgesonthepark.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b846d75bdfd---72725334288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cageart.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16080a14a29664---74296321952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ailani.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7013ece41faafdc17542682f05d536a8/54044619800.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cristiandellavedova.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/nrpdjff48ocj5fmurt5gsm2qh3/27954407283.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cullinanconstruction.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/m5tj8l9rb288s71v3abqlufg2j/famozozanebofex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://antoinepanau.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/89ea10139e80f8d329cc2641076d7b60/17258455873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ptlittleflower.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/q9ef8m4cltb2hqkne1pr1pfqel/jovenoxeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pleasanthillpchurch.com/clients/5/55/55aa087cacc886b2254ddcc242c0699b/File/44847241118.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://personalloan2u.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/15559baf051b3fdc0b403da6d1016120/64347509285.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agermag.ro/mm/file/sapunefob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://assessmentinsight.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wazavefup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hkha.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nesej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=russian+noun+case+endings+chartPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001dfaf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DFAF 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001f7c1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F7C1 27952 bytes
SHA-256: cf603fbfeb11a3e6f69c98d0b6fdc69b209592550a384e94420604076bd6331e
font_02_sfnt_off00023f6f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x23F6F 10748 bytes
SHA-256: d43d37050e06ac69ad1123a773ce23e85b5ab772d427e70e34faad12180570f7

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