RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 46415edaf6d4465a

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.9 KB First seen: 2022-06-24

MD5: 1f4068b8fbcd290af4056a7a4ab4c0e2 SHA-1: a478d43b4596537dca5e79b3064829ee9c13482c SHA-256: 46415edaf6d4465ad960e3954137b4e6ebeb8290a04c03d9fc86c95ac1bbd91a

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, `CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE`, `RTF_OBJUPDATE`, and `RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM` heuristics strongly indicates this exploit. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual lures, but the exploit itself is the primary indicator of malicious intent, likely serving as a dropper for further stages.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000009ce.bin` `cc9c3ee361d3a296ca7fbfe23b7a0fd0b09880d9bd5bb32d1e409e778e4fa962`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x9CE	4248 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.