Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 462980f7da51006c…

MALICIOUS

RTF

24.0 KB First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: 25ece972606d1ec6dce28362ce5203d9 SHA-1: fb3b3880816acec2c64f2f02ab7d7caf1c2c441e SHA-256: 462980f7da51006c88a661e677586565c5aadcce20ebd59c2382300fa79bf458
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. The objdata artifact suggests the embedded object is a binary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001cc3.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CC3 2239 bytes
SHA-256: 97e755edbd62be5c77c29a92abbd038be3f89160b18ef358c074ebc501acfe8d

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