Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4624672d7b51d9a1…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.17 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-15
MD5: db99b8955cdbd95f533b554bb6f184ac SHA-1: 591ce6c6fb1cd652c536a98f94b394d38a19d1aa SHA-256: 4624672d7b51d9a170730560ae4b3075c084a3b756f7452d33a630916c4ae7f5
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a secondary payload from http://192.210.175.4/FBV/1/000OO0OO0O0O0O0O00000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.DOC. Additionally, it contains an embedded PDF with suspicious findings and an external URI pointing to http://www.albwardydamen.com/, suggesting a multi-stage infection chain.

Heuristics 7

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.albwardydamen.com/
    • http://192.210.175.4/FBV/1/000OO0OO0O0O0O0O00000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.DOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoft
    • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_License
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@
    • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_006_off00014e45.bin
b1bde6654a5fcec6f58ce95fc76b843521e052494b86ee13b633886fde334c47		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x14E45 151792 bytes
stream_007_off00023a0b.bin
bfaaf5910afecd24ddac878a695b8f7fc97fbb1b316e105e288e81a4d05fd976		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x23A0B 144108 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005b800.pdf
0cdca81195d1902f5cf6fe452906edd67204bb552c3e2d1514e5f5f984e47deb		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5B800 847872 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00090a00.pdf
8fc740a8eab30c2d56acf69b8088c70aff91d143fff50c601ee86a8569479648		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x90A00 630272 bytes

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