Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 461743c93f1a91a9…

MALICIOUS

RTF

867.4 KB Created: 2017-11-20 19:23:00 First seen: 2017-12-08
MD5: 2ab13cc24e8b5d8f7a04272bceb1c527 SHA-1: 6caf1db7c647bfcd40a932358e3f679ce75f76c4 SHA-256: 461743c93f1a91a9bfd55992e7fc6a766d7200756419a8445f726801cf8c1b9a
422 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains OLE object data that leverages CVE-2017-0199 or CVE-2017-8759 to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, http://kinesk.com/t/t.php?stats=send&thread=1, is used to download a secondary payload. Metasploit reverse shellcode and references to WinExec, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs indicate the execution of malicious code.

Heuristics 11

  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field. This is the field-delivered OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • ClamAV: Rtf.Downloader.CVE_2017-6336326-3 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Rtf.Downloader.CVE_2017-6336326-3
  • Metasploit reverse_tcp shellcode critical SC_MSF_REVERSE
    Metasploit reverse_tcp shellcode
    Disassembly
    Attempted x86 opcode disassembly
    0007103F  fc                cld
    00071040  e882000000        call 0x710c7
    00071045  5f                pop edi
    00071046  5e                pop esi
    00071047  5b                pop ebx
    00071048  8be5              mov esp, ebp
    0007104A  5d                pop ebp
    0007104B  c3                ret
    0007104C  8d4000            lea eax, [eax]
    0007104F  53                push ebx
    00071050  56                push esi
    00071051  8bd8              mov ebx, eax
    00071053  3b5324            cmp edx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x24]
    00071056  7436              je 0x7108e
    00071058  8bf2              mov esi, edx
    0007105A  85f6              test esi, esi
    0007105C  7518              jne 0x71076
    0007105E  33c0              xor eax, eax
    00071060  8a4318            mov al, byte ptr [ebx + 0x18]
    00071063  8b048528ef4700    mov eax, dword ptr [eax*4 + 0x47ef28]
    0007106A  50                push eax
    0007106B  a1f06c4800        mov eax, dword ptr [0x486cf0]
    00071070  8b00              mov eax, dword ptr [eax]
    00071072  ffd0              call eax
    00071074  8bd0              mov edx, eax
    00071076  895324            mov dword ptr [ebx + 0x24], edx
    00071079  c6434401          mov byte ptr [ebx + 0x44], 1
    0007107D  8b4304            mov eax, dword ptr [ebx + 4]
    00071080  e8ba060000        call 0x7173f
    00071085  85f6              test esi, esi
    00071087  7505              jne 0x7108e
    00071089  33c0              xor eax, eax
    0007108B  894324            mov dword ptr [ebx + 0x24], eax
    0007108E  5e                pop esi
    0007108F  5b                pop ebx
    00071090  c3                ret
    00071091  8bc0              mov eax, eax
    00071093  3b5028            cmp edx, dword ptr [eax + 0x28]
    00071096  7413              je 0x710ab
    00071098  895028            mov dword ptr [eax + 0x28], edx
    0007109B  c6402c00          mov byte ptr [eax + 0x2c], 0
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE remote URL high RTF_INCLUDE_REMOTE
    RTF document uses INCLUDETEXT or INCLUDEPICTURE with an http:// URL — Word can fetch the remote content on open depending on Office version and external-content settings, enabling remote template injection, NTLM capture via redirects, or payload delivery
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kinesk.com/t/t.php?stats=send&thread=1 In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000c568.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC568 2598 bytes
SHA-256: a146c6985c10cbb56b61e41b392364f6f1e5bee352ccf463b85b1634b13ec499
objdata_01_off0000dc96.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDC96 2674 bytes
SHA-256: e293e79ea09eae7ddd4701951c07de9d4affcb93fe1bb6b246b18458b3d3f766