Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 45fa1e82154b99ce…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.31 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-13
MD5: e3c3c3ef9cc0e6864ce08376480f6d9c SHA-1: 71692416d5edd1498bc1596bacacbfe5cd4c328f SHA-256: 45fa1e82154b99cef8a5944da33b01e71ee5576cbf169debabd0c4d4b0757d9a
312 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor object known to exploit CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to a suspicious URL. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques, suggesting an attempt to conceal its malicious nature.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EAX)
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
063a2a44017ee43f64523ec712324bff9733460ceee25f06a60680d2699bea07		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0022DF7C/oLe10NaTIVE 1866 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006f600.pdf
1931b2bdc9faacf82922c070f1bf7c27faadf0670815a5876cdebde03e890333		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6F600 914432 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
f552ce31cc9fc3a425b26191d62a564f49290ac71df7e4cfaf3472d8ff6ae75e		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1366528 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
c5a049289d3b63a0e9171391650d02bc0beea8b038b02961ad1c105c2980f1e7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1344512 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
f8eb4657493baa35813cb25878631f8ebc2a689be75cdec167f2f623dc027c5a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 1201664 bytes

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