Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 45e5c1e8c51c649d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.5 KB Created: 2020-09-10 17:52:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-07
MD5: 179973ebf538091f0178bf5aae72cbea SHA-1: 28f4c980cd2113ac43ae49a9757d3583d19a777a SHA-256: 45e5c1e8c51c649db19b53160e9d2d1d6a53a135af655cd55b0c214edee1fcea
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that matches one of the extracted malicious links. This suggests the PDF is designed to redirect users to malicious sites, likely for SEO poisoning or to host further malicious content. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct execution capabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=information+about+pakistan+flag+in+english In PDF document text
    • http://files.lostsalon.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606533/venasoxilutoje-nazodowaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mhfacilities.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070452/a3a74229c20.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vadoraw.chandascreations.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437119/juvegureni-ragaxa-dosagatajumido.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fobav.turnerchamber.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969465/wudedal_lutexogetax_vozefawuj_wodef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gusuxego.absolute-electric.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453459/3869d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sohappytolearn.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406800/nonexuna_lukupumapowezi_lasifiz_rulivegina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.umearth.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383456/1861924.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9199/2484/files/tabufijajukugemoretev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0127/3758/files/28589493212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5693/8664/files/fopexanijonoxobisil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/8976/2206/files/xefefofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/edb4a7_04826d7230e1455781652622b0e8b981.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ec0c41_ce06179050044b06b15f3907219bec09.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 3

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006651.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6651 5340 bytes
SHA-256: fd550fa9253b339daf3106021f9386be6d9501f361e86653f0e9234b1c302330
font_01_sfnt_off00007845.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7845 10088 bytes
SHA-256: cbbb0c9fe1bf657a3c5183bdfb6279246277578f1e417a0bac242faad1b33456
font_02_sfnt_off00009ac6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9AC6 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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