Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 45a13f1a537bec19…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

21.4 KB Created: 2017-12-14 13:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-04-26
MD5: c73c262b2b20e8a23f8b444735b19054 SHA-1: 8396ee128822f07ddce9eae01e7771532eae22e9 SHA-256: 45a13f1a537bec19ede5d6b4023493382bf4ccdbe0253ae48fd6b982fae97146
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a malicious OOXML document that leverages the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability. It contains an external OLE object pointing to a suspicious URL, which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic firings directly indicate exploitation of this CVE and the presence of an external OLE object, strongly suggesting a drive-by download attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://github.com@107.173.143.29/.-.--.-.-.-.--.----qQq------............qQQ.-.-------..Q..------.Q.W--w...-Qq......----....QQ--q.-Q/.-.--.-.-.-.--.----qQq------............qQQ.-.-------..Q..------.Q
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
c3d4c5dfe019e61c614b81733887bf8fd99cb8f2410d9a04904661c77c0a64e7		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 49184 bytes

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