Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 458c0e3b7f0583b2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

82.0 KB Created: 2021-01-20 20:00:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 816ca12639b877ad34ca10ab9986bb7c SHA-1: b4c30a2ef464e338b8af2bb1ccd8ab00451ff6d9 SHA-256: 458c0e3b7f0583b2a320909b0304e5416dbfd71b390bb0f8eb808f507ccc756e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically triggering a Document_Open macro and using CreateObject. This indicates an automated execution path intended to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV detection further supports its malicious nature as a downloader. No specific family could be identified, and no external IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.87f88707f007f878-OOXML-9981544-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.87f88707f007f878-OOXML-9981544-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
952711b956db61f4507153dad3037176443db77dc181b765cc64474145b08b39
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2069 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
5a2b2f26382bcf787a7fc07777fe24cc9ea93227384732872e328feaf8bf8dae
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 60928 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.