Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 457d9f139975b1fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

91.8 KB Created: 2021-08-12 18:13:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 14661d301fc6c758b50f3e824d5ce955 SHA-1: 3ee2f1f8059d8495371473172f5d6a6300175cad SHA-256: 457d9f139975b1fd6f855a7e32f204b1d16c3a224f35363f72220c5439b82aee
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate maliciousness. The PDF contains a link farm pointing to multiple compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to distribute malware or phishing content. Embedded JavaScript streams are also present, which could be used to further obfuscate the malicious intent or initiate downloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://clumba-indoor.ru/files/files/15981943846.pdf
    • https://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a9087cf304---36091530119.pdf
    • http://argra.rs/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609147864f085---xogipomupakuzuva.pdf
    • http://wellfoto.cz/pictures/files/naxaz.pdf
    • https://www.certificagreen.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b27b328bd17---18251619519.pdf
    • http://austral-immo.com/userfiles/files/dutakiraroj.pdf
    • https://webfox.net.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/eccf68a0c2025add0c0e491f03db7b50/15414928603.pdf
    • http://morethancars.nl/uploads/edytor/file/fapewagebevifajapotapegab.pdf
    • https://boumqueur-edition.com/upload/fckeditor/file/vukiritomekoxo.pdf
    • http://sarahscupcakery.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c9611b5af3---dexada.pdf
    • https://tfnd.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dc8d1eea22b8c9201969eed4032829b6/87734947179.pdf
    • http://vhktn.at/images/content/files/9680973585.pdf
    • http://jl-vacuum.com/upload/files/bubojewolunatavibatifepe.pdf
    • http://rymwid-training.com/userfiles/file/rubaxupiselujejixiwogepa.pdf
    • https://maydongy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h3d0bkaurrv0l1bgeleibp0qnm/piselep.pdf
    • http://soloparamideco.com/js/new/fckeditor/userfiles/file/vudimolofolovubovef.pdf
    • http://www.medicalalliedtraining.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d72545b7ce9---latezewawemu.pdf
    • https://californiaoptionsrealestate.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a9a7196c420d98587b4b4e28314ad862/riwemev.pdf
    • https://www.numberoneporthill.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16092e6138878a---wuzovigixisenatimapu.pdf
    • http://banghetretruc.com/media/ftp/file/rosub.pdf
    • https://hpx.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/79c94c4bfadfb991200bf247bc1f8bb1/bijutamas.pdf
    • http://gianniarnaudo.com/userfiles/files/bogalagopoko.pdf
    • http://windcampus.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16090189be4ace---99441573773.pdf
    • https://www.burit.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087ad1da0b07---webexarar.pdf
    • http://sts-logistika.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3dc9b065ae34a0ff22534be89afacea1/giwowamukowavi.pdf
    • http://www.pianoszimmermann.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f3d3e58b4cf---sujenofamivevanixudewa.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B4+%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BA%D0%B8+%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8+%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C+%D0%BA%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B3%D1%83+%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE+%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%B7+%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e922.bin
2a07c67f31fdb5a4686da54adfa2522eb8fbcd809d2ca0260130ca3854e59cd2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE922 25964 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00012981.bin
68118f67f38f5ae101f481dc28c459cb01ec3049bd7ccf2890864c92e03b9312
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12981 11248 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000143a4.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x143A4 16792 bytes