Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 457aa67e04d80ce3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.3 KB Created: 2021-07-09 22:04:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 637519b1f8b19f7f8d27cd3cbb2718cf SHA-1: e5813e6debf536ceabbc63436c6eb4671ba3103c SHA-256: 457aa67e04d80ce3f5eab19fec3e0b257168a90a7b751c312d12a0b4ac15dda1
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains numerous external links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites and disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the nature of the links and the PDF structure align with techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites, potentially for further exploitation.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9952

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crysiq.ru/uplcv?utm_term=an+independent+study+guide+to+reading+latin+pdf
    • https://caribemed.com/userfiles/file/34572411947.pdf
    • https://www.actionconstructionjax.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2ec189dddbee8058173d74c178dda12b/duxagalaletiveditamibeza.pdf
    • http://artistalexanderkanevskyroyalshakespeareglobetheatrelondon.com/clientMedia/file/pepinaragikarageb.pdf
    • http://saxonsaxtonfamilyreunion.com/clients/f/f6/f6d0431f970e0833b0867c311dafb132/File/63801895140.pdf
    • https://bbpartner.cz/userfiles/file/97199388115.pdf
    • http://2girlstrippin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfe4b2a61b1---83952420052.pdf
    • http://sequirk.ie/userfiles/file/gudasilusewo.pdf
    • https://cspdental.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5485a4bdd4c96f55feea026ddd1d4be9/32610979932.pdf
    • http://fabtur.ru/upload/files/4227125776.pdf
    • https://www.coconutlodge.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609f6fd676674---puvetorebuvudapi.pdf
    • https://anjingliar2.com/contents//files/78417983044.pdf
    • https://muachungbaohiem.com/uploads/userfiles/file/kajoti.pdf
    • http://alliance-ltd.com/userfiles/31436642622.pdf
    • https://performanceltg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/36b29ce54bcdb75c1d9434e91f3a382f/71342462249.pdf
    • http://dgjinhak.kr/DATA/upload/files/202105271032289802.pdf
    • http://xn--80aantfcaehjbxzf1m.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/navutamukepewaliwubanafa.pdf
    • http://ehsclassof64.com/clients/b/bf/bfa5c4411462ceee4a19e543862d902c/File/tuzumotuputi.pdf
    • http://perfectthesale.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160de9d865a038---49839491585.pdf
    • https://g-ortho.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6390fc779c---xipas.pdf
    • http://socialbomjesus.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bfbdcea2e9f---ximeme.pdf
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078d11922f6d---11083756019.pdf
    • http://trendstyleimage.com/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/69015401031.pdf
    • https://ekselantechnology.solutions/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vabevitidojejutedonat.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee2e.bin
d0219f85a732197a8bbde548f31d0a16758a955890baf0063a9051f428d477b0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE2E 17000 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011abf.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11ABF 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000132d6.bin
2a5a7ddcac767f6beda5b274dba4e9b5023cfbb63ad9375015eacd39b40a4d67
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x132D6 10868 bytes