Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 456a4933999e838d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.7 KB Created: 2020-07-09 13:05:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: 40e1833f660b896e573678e9ffe6a1d5 SHA-1: d703deddb6a1cdf7d15ebc690ec398d7dbd39ba9 SHA-256: 456a4933999e838d3ed2ad5099239ff491dfd210bddcee3930abc0470dbf37af
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to suspicious domains and are likely part of a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to a known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body text and embedded links suggest a lure related to 'clearance certificates' to entice users to click on these malicious URLs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=frcgw%20clearance%20certificate%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.in2improv.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969910/kojuwodela.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.aminzargar.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131872096/5236290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.smoothtransitionservices.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871829/e067dc4fe21f6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ronnieroseband.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813797/a7f99.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.cuestacollegerodeo.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383621/zeweruvodunewekeribe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.familiesforeverministries.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453934/f57936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.melaningracecosmetics.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874035/3de57b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.airdriekarate.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407263/6f389.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thirdcinemaproductions.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379749/sonazez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://xoboxiruva.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/vosodebujewarimuvut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xizipif.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sisokilodij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rukobiva.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/14545526426.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zezumova.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/12056521876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://belonuwulaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/63163082127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/17810153535.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/jepomosojavadoji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/5561128363.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/83583068491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000686d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x686D 4872 bytes
SHA-256: 08c74168dc842e1f2f329cd246aeb4fa729bfedf0e66010f8805ef6b38832058
font_01_sfnt_off00007913.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7913 10716 bytes
SHA-256: f87fc1f4888e72784b20ddfd9e5a19ddae4ca24d12d06f4b835d726965098728

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.