Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 455dcb6dcc1061f9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.5 KB Created: 2020-08-31 15:27:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 64d6a82bd07922787c87303ce675c0f0 SHA-1: fab576bde565713dd5c905434d8af62fa8b1938c SHA-256: 455dcb6dcc1061f97838334e447e03c38d1ead30b50b394922da27634e2dcf16
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains multiple embedded links, with one heuristic specifically identifying a link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the same URL found in the heuristic, suggesting an attempt to direct users to malicious infrastructure. The presence of numerous links points towards a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic to increase visibility and lure victims.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=anidamiento+significado+informatica
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2936/4889/files/apposer_une_signature.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0835/2679/files/gudasoxibaperenafubixinar.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7974/6201/files/30266477361.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e32576_d6f1cbeb7bbc42cea18fd07a471facd4.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b7082a_9979be4eb1464c10806b914b6bc06089.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0c41e7_d52b1d1223ee4f0785a1c35717103b49.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_97af487722aa4dc08d086975bf48716b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_eb565f218451427fb885b22ba80aca81.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_727369acb38440cc9e82b2393f2d1ed3.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/9b5f63_900b4b4efd7f45038e5536e644979c0a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_a96ba4d53c5d49dcb42b83e3e8453bac.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ecec20_dae3144f11c840df92a7fb784385212f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_441e3a808b99455dab9bd83af84f3a4f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a01749_3e8899c407a0464f9b3f312b0ecc6d58.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_30a319ecbfb8443d8351d97a3c243ee1.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/e73fea_db8494eb21c640a1babf8906583a534b.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_727369acb3844

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b39f.bin
9a98723dae936e7c7c8d502cfbcf27bf9f93cff28ba6a06675a6a95244fbc4de
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB39F 1696 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000bbc9.bin
87633470341706b37531b4819b7817233b4bdaa304dd2e64bbb02f0cf6dc87f8
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBBC9 5300 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000cdbd.bin
bc4f8e83025338d8506030fb317d8dc69b8818658ba3317b21152a1ee50c9bea
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCDBD 17716 bytes