Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 455af9180f83ac2b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.2 KB
MD5: 4cd4423a36b8f7d1375ec7478d3c0186 SHA-1: 8e7cc411cc89a35689782b4fcdedec473c159d13 SHA-256: 455af9180f83ac2ba91fd77b48592679cdaf79c7d70a2251ab19d7edd15338f7
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to activate embedded content. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable macros or editing to trigger the malicious behavior. This suggests a delivery mechanism aimed at social engineering the user into executing a payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
2b3b13e6aaa02c4f5095a061edc065329c9a06a5c88174c4dc8f6cd71e602801
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20575 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b132.bin
1af484323aa51f0bc067b498458ed2106db428c7b743185ac9a6e18e7b648e31
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB132 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c6d5.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC6D5 12297 bytes