Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 454e907ad4d0746c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

286.0 KB Created: 2022-08-14 17:43:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-15
MD5: 350a0666627f9cbdc42b43b8a133f856 SHA-1: 34e5e9b2dcb4b693d35dc8d7fa7b361de6a2e38f SHA-256: 454e907ad4d0746c66051e7c02dd1c1827ab96d086e3e7b9e2cdb091f7722b32
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically noting a '.jar' extension. The presence of this embedded object strongly suggests an attempt to deliver and execute a secondary malicious component.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
9009d51d92ee1b262284c2c08428d497725993e31259fe350af5932ace3ad5a6		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 184320 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
f86612e4b217805bbeaa6e23eab9b38e496bc4be89ba41499c252690f3443a02		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 180049 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
0f02138b6b82ea039fb4baa35d5f4ef3c9abe14ad022c8951cb8fd8afc034e97		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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