PDF malware analysis — malicious · 4508b93f55c9a004

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.6 KB Created: 2020-11-08 13:33:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-03-01

MD5: 960994436c5d23853ee98cad5c2e0bf3 SHA-1: 8ab89af9a70270b6fd8abb75c790b21728e6ba35 SHA-256: 4508b93f55c9a0042b7e07a2704a0a939ce469bddd5ffb5ef3377c7b0ea70904

134 Risk Score

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=nonstop+knight+mod+apk In PDF document text
- https://kuwofepex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740654/zurogo.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4456128/normal_5fa6db3330706.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375908/normal_5f89e3bd99d0d.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://pevugubak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740457/8225448.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://femodufawo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134317846/1944703.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- https://wesiguremep.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/into_the_woods_prologue_sheet_music.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wolina/tusevapokedipugizun.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://xiwejegi.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/data_science_from_scratch_2019.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://xumalet.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/68369747445.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off000061fa.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61FA	5280 bytes
SHA-256: `4aeb05324edf2525bc87cf6e14bf73515b4adc718cf10aef22956102d682a09a`
`font_01_sfnt_off000073cf.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73CF	10044 bytes
SHA-256: `99f88229b3700e2bd14f21c44f1c354a56334ebd8254eca168f0b6335571f6ac`

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.