Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 44f060eefb28b1d9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.71 MB
MD5: c428f38a84f17399a88559e3fc68fff5 SHA-1: c7e83930cce6e7e672d5e844b8148a024a1e901a SHA-256: 44f060eefb28b1d90759eb517c0e134e52164a2701e4f4d9ddbbbd27f48cce2c
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects and the Equation.3 ProgID, which is specifically designed to trigger CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802. The use of  objupdate forces automatic activation of the object, bypassing user interaction to achieve remote code execution. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the binary OLE objects are the primary delivery mechanism for the payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
7b8e47558b2d10c3610012fec5af7559d49fac503543e5b71433044fccf48e61		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 34262 bytes
objdata_01_off0001df87.bin
abd132bf3ab8190dfb030bcb879a36061e9aef78c1060b63bd0588b35c7d316c		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1DF87 454791 bytes

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