Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 44ea1ffc89314eef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

25.9 KB Created: 2016-09-19 08:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2025-05-07
MD5: 2fdd28e45b4f37dc7fd8ac8591eb28cd SHA-1: 4e956b750358c2d7f0fa9d3a0f039f291dbadcc4 SHA-256: 44ea1ffc89314eef5e7dc7ceb1e965feab1f1be2a7adca3bb40e3a974414fafe
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a DOCM file containing a VBA macro that executes obfuscated code. Critical heuristics indicate the presence of an obfuscated shell command with a URL and an auto-exec loader. This suggests the macro's primary function is to download and execute a second-stage payload, consistent with downloader malware families.

Heuristics 12

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Donoff-10030344-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.Donoff-10030344-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://judgedeborahshallcross.com/67SELbosjc358
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
72a5c604e0f96a1a3fbc75ca0e414c4fea1afbf5f5bf3fb4eb90279e17d2a873		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12696 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
vbaProject_00.bin
838b6b664f329768e2491ba70cafcc3797c67844f01e2529c9e5bdf16301d2e6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 33280 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Donoff-10030344-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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