Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 44e24b95c6c94220…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

164.5 KB Created: 2007-12-03 01:19:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: bd11a7e5f9c2fa0f8b42da4cfdf060b2 SHA-1: d7ad1503b03e183c0df7ad6b13b833d677d14d41 SHA-256: 44e24b95c6c94220142ad1c01df238fd29538550b708fcf23109958d0b344979
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The OLE file exhibits significant slack space and appended payload bytes, strongly suggesting it's a malicious container. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of these anomalies points to a likely attempt to conceal and deliver a secondary malicious payload. The file's structure and the nature of the anomalies are consistent with common techniques used to distribute malware.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 168,448 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 151,962 bytes (90%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.