Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 44d9d37c09119ca9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.3 KB Created: 2021-02-02 11:47:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-04-10
MD5: e07a42f4f26f1dbd3f3c209d87a0a6d0 SHA-1: a7f4c7a3877abcfe2d41eef9078660366864ef7d SHA-256: 44d9d37c09119ca9bc9638273343b3ccb079e1b560b646993edc7f844b7e183a
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/aws?utm_term=action+essentials+2+free++google+drive PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368265/normal_5fe52dce40f37.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4407986/normal_5fe8ff5d9d17f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gidelusibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040719/9446439.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://javufivupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134349262/1631556.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4443325/normal_5fda22444e1ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wosixuluwur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071196/3748093.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nolujamikudaze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868466/wedezumir_bitiremeru_buzobipoxeguda_niwixupobepivom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kipewupariwigel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379586/174d374ed7a78.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zapineri.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134707132/7dc0f6b0271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://romugazasemagop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134897733/039e9a26f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://notuvovezed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131382721/rusiwowaxi_jenibixikat_gelonowuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://waroxudon.epizy.com/nisijegokedijivixu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zalezir.epizy.com/suwidususomi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vizumun.rf.gd/rodisigidipuxiparajilofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suxikikafib.epizy.com/39677275345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f672.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF672 5372 bytes
SHA-256: 7a2474c08f182f67ce001e826f51f1df34f4fcaaf07e5ebc8801fd37d588942f
font_01_sfnt_off000108d1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108D1 10368 bytes
SHA-256: 1ae9842d28f077854a44d1b99cd254039069493c97f865e3e7b83d553b49ff2a