PDF malware analysis — malicious · 44acb41468b47009

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.6 KB

MD5: 8128d384dc57929fcff5255b014b34cc SHA-1: dceaf20fb8b56b17c064e96fe0527b0bf3c94c2d SHA-256: 44acb41468b47009e2942f4d5d52e049c1474e3353ef80439f082599fa45d965

126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

The PDF sample leverages the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability, specifically the Collab.collectEmailInfo method, to execute embedded JavaScript. This initial script acts as a stager, decoding and executing a larger, obfuscated JavaScript payload. The recovered JavaScript streams indicate a multi-stage execution process designed to hide malicious activity. The primary intent appears to be the download and execution of a second-stage payload, though the final target is not discernible from the provided evidence.

Heuristics 6

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `b9a85ee399db318b3ad68d0755effe289a645a7404fad2094712c8a3fd042920`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19B	244 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `74e0ffd5cdf320dee53d067e1525adcc85145f1a8ef41b6aec3730330593fffc`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5247 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `82d50219a7a7e6c4f38727c35acb4f693e7653f5a0d55d3af998731ad31bb5a8`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	44873 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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