Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 449c2d0f66cb4c9a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

230.2 KB Created: 2022-08-01 20:28:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-02
MD5: fb8961c280c00d08b22c8f8f9315d9e3 SHA-1: bf59dcba6347507d0ac2810937727fb36fd502ee SHA-256: 449c2d0f66cb4c9acaa508adfb09ad62512f46a64d5491ef508f00313fd4f89e
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE object is a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The embedded artifact names suggest the dropped payload is likely named 'ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin'.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
559bd6c3e14ea9dfa81462b1ff3a55ec6afbf48598f45854264eb5be7113db31		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 177152 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
351efc343e204fb4d02768faabe996aee19be785086755bdaf25441aeb57f7e3		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 172723 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
33bbfaeeca53651654753e27940201f783e49282c78bcf807fa4a659392ba64e		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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