Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4480f3dae5c50c2a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

279.1 KB Created: 2022-08-14 18:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-08-16
MD5: 720fa6f08fe167039d1df729db5859c1 SHA-1: b088ccd738bb55c0b82f186cb266b9688a9a955e SHA-256: 4480f3dae5c50c2a6d994b11fdf4ffb5c90dbf9208270b57cb0bf0cdb74170d3
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: DLL Side-Loading

The OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object, identified as a risky file type that drops an auto-executable payload. Static triage also flagged a suspicious extracted artifact, specifically an OLE package. These findings indicate the document's primary function is to deliver a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
7cc9aea8c07c0433145d28dcc4ac85a52c4d642b2a9c1c8a797b6e1c801f8f86		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 177664 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
b0caf1a379014e95be1879a503af681c7dd5a0813f2109816f752b505eb361a3		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 173207 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
6e4e914ca90ecd55ffe5b95bdf8803b22c5755666adb73f75db20af0a1e5d772		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image3.emf 5464 bytes

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