Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4450f5ef46e00a67…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.1 KB Created: 2020-10-31 16:06:59 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-12
MD5: 0e55328b48e7dac5d8fe3bb61969ee67 SHA-1: c4491c0b09566ee89357044d099daafeaac215c6 SHA-256: 4450f5ef46e00a675d0953af6a043935d76cd81ad6448c93ca43b82c03b03ab2
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting or known redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of malicious redirector links and a link farm. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also listed in the extracted URLs, suggesting a coordinated effort to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=the+power+of+love+rhonda+byrne+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://purolejomi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776639/2345862.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sozivutapadonen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164462/446bc0a36280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://misutinulil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407711/mepuxotu-bowukapubisoriw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373516/normal_5f8d1ff76bf1c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366362/normal_5f960647d0e0b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408865/normal_5f9bb5c956d5f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuxewisi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235501/5495016.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369793/normal_5f9b8895ce2c1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jozokuxig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814463/a55f31b597d37b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417145/normal_5f9c5315914fe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarusegibitumet/ridinaradawudelirovo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/48517964-4525-4648-8f58-37e5f8780103/mazinosapabukumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/juliziwojatige/hong_kong_airport_terminal_1_map.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/desenaz/wokivevovorobatudozokape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000066db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x66DB 4952 bytes
SHA-256: af46e10adb38d5986bb884d814e9e32971bbdd5937ec1e08802a2ec3e33ca72d
font_01_sfnt_off000077b7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x77B7 11392 bytes
SHA-256: ec2d7e4ff1683a6c639cf8d1c67fee46c3102dcd880229cbb5b77368397a0eda
font_02_sfnt_off00009da3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9DA3 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2

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