Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 44459a7ed0ec4962…

MALICIOUS

PDF

57.3 KB Created: 2021-07-17 08:19:07 +00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft® Word 2016 (via www.ilovepdf.com)
MD5: 7fc04c3550d0f09894554c5546b1733d SHA-1: 116e82913f9fb650b23523826012b77268634fdf SHA-256: 44459a7ed0ec49623f6cfea55ff334f6f9b4c4ebdac95d811dec9b5c5e6e7874
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample exhibits characteristics of an advance-fee scam and a payment redirection lure, suggesting it aims to deceive the user into fraudulent financial activities. While no scripts were extracted, the embedded URLs and document heuristics strongly indicate a phishing or social engineering attempt. The document's structure and content are designed to mimic legitimate financial communications.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0001

Heuristics 3

  • Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE
    Document contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/truetype/fonts/wingdings/You
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0O
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00000684.bin
f10b31589b78ac0af1016262f639406d4b6989010de72700b9e351e5830f742e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x684 28344 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00003e43.bin
375c0a2f02826b4ff1ab499735e096ff8608d39bbe14d9074baa5f62bc52a41a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3E43 77920 bytes

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