Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4437295e4489e75e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

117.7 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 5e0442c180c657da97db8b2d75997a27 SHA-1: 641b6d08f08967509301286e5e3847446e6d152f SHA-256: 4437295e4489e75eafe8b683cc383bf43b56f4268c0c5b1486e7173199e6074f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1055 Process Injection

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristic firings for CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, indicating it attempts to dynamically load and execute code. The OLE Slack Anomaly suggests padding or obfuscation within the file structure. While no document body text or scripts were provided for direct analysis of user-facing lures or specific script actions, the API calls strongly suggest the file is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The benign nature of the extracted URLs means they are unlikely to be directly involved in the malicious payload delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 120,520 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 95,955 bytes (80%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com01
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://csc3-2009-2-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2009-2.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://csc3-2009-2-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2009-2.cer0
    • https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
    • http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif0
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0