Malware Insights
The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristic firings for CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, indicating it attempts to dynamically load and execute code. The OLE Slack Anomaly suggests padding or obfuscation within the file structure. While no document body text or scripts were provided for direct analysis of user-facing lures or specific script actions, the API calls strongly suggest the file is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The benign nature of the extracted URLs means they are unlikely to be directly involved in the malicious payload delivery.
Heuristics 6
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Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESSReference to CreateProcess API
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Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARYReference to LoadLibrary API
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Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESSReference to GetProcAddress API
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OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALYOLE file is 120,520 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 95,955 bytes (80%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
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Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOCReference to VirtualAlloc API
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://ocsp.verisign.com0
- http://ocsp.verisign.com01
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa
- http://csc3-2009-2-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2009-2.crl0D
- https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
- http://csc3-2009-2-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2009-2.cer0
- https://www.verisign.com/cps0*
- http://logo.verisign.com/vslogo.gif0
- http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0
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