RTF malware analysis — malicious · 4435554b4906c5a2

MALICIOUS

RTF

5.0 KB

MD5: 3d081d1bd8aa121b56754528d7b13981 SHA-1: 87db49098bc0aa0b88dfa5c7f3954544dd3058df SHA-256: 4435554b4906c5a294e08a579a0bd6e7ae78bd0dcce24a7225a29ab2a731bd28

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE object activation, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code. The presence of multiple \objdata sections further supports the embedding of malicious content.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000d2.bin` `2fcd8ce85772e1f60a5ffbd6bcd7f28e25b4936e2f44e32e0362f587a9d19d14`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xD2	2179 bytes

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