Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 43fc23c002586402…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.4 KB
MD5: fb5f8ac02b52ca66be283642c6ab18b0 SHA-1: 5c6910ab335b55983c75fdcc30b58658496dd8ce SHA-256: 43fc23c00258640226d7ed771e471f1fd8f56cf13bcc32caf703ba6d858f27d7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit likely leads to the execution of arbitrary code upon opening the document, a common technique for initial access.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b6.bin
ed1799472e4c527ca132661360b17426f5ec79b2095f50a2f57abd5a6a4088ae
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB6 1433 bytes