Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 43ea1b162f6fccb8

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

53.5 KB First seen: 2022-08-30

MD5: b035d4f60a5b8e15b5f855ddffca7399 SHA-1: e62235605d984d12f341244acd2bb1798264eb30 SHA-256: 43ea1b162f6fccb845ff1f81fe0cf5bb3aa9380b135df6f088c83a25acf2599d

142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1566 Phishing T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. The exploit carrier is an embedded OLE object that contains a URL pointing to a remote loader. This indicates the document is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload from the specified URL.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE

Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE

OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML

OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://username@172.245.142.47/..------............----------------...------_-----------...----._---.--....-/https_n/www.doc

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.