Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 43dea67f5df9db50…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.9 KB Created: 2021-08-02 04:23:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 4d828ce0caac0b65e59974553b195306 SHA-1: b54c3b88d9d9572e01f15c89b3ed54b0c812a16b SHA-256: 43dea67f5df9db50912464cdc34c034c6db4335f60dd9ef44cac7074692854ae
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a link farm hosted on compromised WordPress sites, designed to trick users into downloading a malicious file. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the nature of the link farm and the detection results suggest it's a lure for further malicious activity.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9989

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://multiseal.com.ph/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a083668680---55270740203.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://aj-logistics.com/stock/userfiles/file/77708704557.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.peritaonline.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/radomamidawomirejasir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://angelsstaff.com/uploads/file/27940181157.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://studiogreenwich.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dc3229ba6c27d27cf09d5650451e7e61/32648693928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kolodezrus.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b3b985be28b286ebffceadcad666476d/2513359875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uleiuri.ro/userfiles/file/xevujofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alignerco.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7e5b96b441a5ec81a32d4f5afc352265/fufef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vizesblokk.hu/files/file/48210138265.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.karenlovelee.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160707e147711a---difitamatir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://turagent007.ru/userfiles/file/69547465793.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://indel.sk/userfiles/file/nobudubinapuwofasobuted.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://avenirpourtous.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c8ac622909---daborukikevajujewin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://trungnguyenjsc.vn/uploads/image/files/narof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pasarantogel2.com/contents//files/gokewerubelifexunowinowo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://flightshop.jp/images/blog//file/62682794747.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.thaiboat.net/image/upload/File/kakifaxinaweje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.julitolaschools.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160921748647f0---55989277772.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accuratesearch.com/userfiles/file/18873429936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sanier.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/liobn4nbqsdlsuo9cpvi4h7736/pumufu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://airflow-skateboards.com/upload/file/8726868573.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://equipociclistaugeraga.com/ciclistas/userfiles/file/jojipoxalek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://schouteninterieurwerk.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161050418dc971---zumudebimidevodil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albatrossmrn.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/67549339306.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=commando+2013+full+movie+watch+online+123moviesPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d7ff.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD7FF 17616 bytes
SHA-256: d838625c81147a3a3089389fb8d8433784a917f49c52a4c3b7d3e99b0be6e318
font_01_sfnt_off0001064d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1064D 11388 bytes
SHA-256: f04d09d5ff865dd943bea2d4511d66d31e94fb26218265000e37cdfaedd19c69
font_02_sfnt_off00012130.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12130 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1