Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 43d639bdeed2601a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: 842083fe8ec2319d2beb5d6f35871c6d SHA-1: fc0865ecddd9890983240ecb01bc4a6f0e5e02a7 SHA-256: 43d639bdeed2601a7415d1098c74db512fc894fbb629c5e8eae9150c84b1b44a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJAUTLINK` strongly indicates an attempt to leverage a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component for arbitrary code execution. No document body or scripts were provided, so the specific payload or further actions are unknown.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ac.bin
510f8b7d3d18292ceba898c13075db5f61d4cbe3298ced117ed8bd653b0302b6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAC 1781 bytes