Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 439b724f096b0bb3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.5 KB Created: 2021-01-01 06:09:36 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: c3e937675ebb13ea41502a40b9a3d04e SHA-1: 054d9964ff02d74c7ab0ceba0404631c68c6dc75 SHA-256: 439b724f096b0bb30a84ca3fce6140655e011f42f229efc0483755c8d69b37df
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded URLs pointing to link farms and a known malicious redirector, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links are indicative of malicious redirection, likely to a phishing page or to download a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/strik?utm_term=hockey+goal+light+for+sale In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4491673/normal_5fc09b633f3f2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jevipugirofi/NlBiaxP/weekly_specials_near_me_restaurant.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kivifakan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134870172/5110605.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kurinunuwor/7ZwggzT/xiremukekugezatotojel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xasakeza/vic7uhc/air_hockey_free_table_canada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xubuvene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380433/4538247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rarugabowutu/V6DZ1LU/bidumalaneluduwemaxudawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xitupiwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134489196/c21d2e5506da8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanuvexugivi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606490/8685206.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tagepixibupiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134586800/koxadu-pujel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizilezena.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134354573/gopuno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xififaxapid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134344339/7663959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jezekemunidup/writing_task_2_band_9_collection.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vekodupiwarobi/49999332803.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/regufojalojaza/ccna_notes_free_download_2013_in_hindi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dd00.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD00 5272 bytes
SHA-256: 56fdfc9c00575d0870789b0d9be4a1633ea800596dc114a07aaa0272e8bd41d2
font_01_sfnt_off0000eef8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEEF8 11332 bytes
SHA-256: 8ccc0450ee38a0015c20dce3e495e560c6ea863026d3c16d8c340c606c5bf23f

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.