Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 433fef750a44d6d4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.3 KB
MD5: 0284c94401a743d97b9cca52ac790864 SHA-1: fc3a473b80e9f717a68c54374aadc016cfe0d9ed SHA-256: 433fef750a44d6d44ebc9acf291ae3ad5812531d8aba3bdf543d44dcff943694
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, indicating an attempt to execute embedded code. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic confirms the document instructs the user to enable content, a common social engineering tactic. While no specific scripts were extracted, the OLE object activation strongly suggests the document's purpose is to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
e9481e05b748756fadc6bbdcb7545863ac9bba9b24c41dcbb1404128b358343b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20622 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b194.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB194 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c737.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC737 12297 bytes