Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 433c852efac88b3a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.03 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 98c1b0da99790ede8724596794327b1b SHA-1: 429844cc0f4bbab57ae99a894944be1b876c565a SHA-256: 433c852efac88b3a0ed917e6aa70af4f244209af8b288d2ecf774516937662ee
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers the CVE-2017-8759 vulnerability. This vulnerability allows for the activation of MSXML SAX, which is a common technique for executing arbitrary code. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects within the RTF structure. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual clues about the intended lure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00101970.bin
0715c1fb68bbbb0b606e598b49e0e336cf1f39ebcce2bd19c41f970f20d2dd3f		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x101970 3739 bytes

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