Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 433941ab5fd7e8c9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

58.7 KB Created: 2010-07-30 19:07:00 UTC Authoring application: Qt 3.3.8b (via GPL Ghostscript 8.63)
MD5: 7ea7ac3f087d9dc97c1dd15ccc19e63e SHA-1: 8ed8490bd8968c3c8f1bf3f4407fca9bb023c299 SHA-256: 433941ab5fd7e8c9662146ff1695946974a56b1076d1a05d335c49c3a7b80bb7
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that leverages a launch action to execute cmd.exe. This command-line interpreter is then used to execute a dropped Windows executable, disguised as 'arquivo.pdf'. This executable was detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0', and the PDF itself was flagged as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'. The attack pattern is consistent with a dropper mechanism designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\arquivo.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
arquivo.pdf
2006c1e1ead47d8a141e14de5244074cfcdc6031d8df71e732272176367db459		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 56 at offset 0x3A7D 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0057_000.js
a08c55e6cfcaf628e0821439bc4f53bc0d4be46001e9f6247008ffa9c6ff3a01		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 57 at offset 0xE686 56 bytes

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