RTF malware analysis — malicious · 4329673b6bb97971

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.7 KB

MD5: 446988fed3c06a2a0195479fccbed955 SHA-1: 3650070fada6121e813e3635b3734d9e80f43653 SHA-256: 4329673b6bb9797151a7eab278f0b82466d73303149f2e9ab797a95d04a982bd

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The heuristics indicate that \objupdate forces OLE activation, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability. The primary goal is likely to download and execute a second-stage payload, although no specific URLs or hashes were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001ce9.bin` `e98fc2162a1f065b187467dc7f30aaf3aa106140c17cbccc89294343eb105546`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CE9	2082 bytes

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